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The Correct-Like Decision in United 
States v. Martignon 
By David Patton∗
INTRODUCTION 
When United States District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., struck 
down the federal anti-bootlegging act1 last year in United States v. 
Martignon,2 he repeatedly employed a term to describe the law—
“copyright-like”—that has provoked much criticism.  
Commentators have criticized the phrasing as either imprecise,3 
nonsensical,4 or merely insufficient as a basis for striking down the 
statute.5  And a federal court in California, in disagreeing with the 
holding of Martignon, specifically noted that use of the term was 
“not particularly helpful.”6
Judge Baer, however, was not the first to use the term 
“copyright-like,” and he will likely not be the last.  Seemingly 
vague descriptions of laws as “copyright-like” or “quasi-
copyright” are sure to appear in future opinions as courts evaluate 
congressional authority to pass a new generation of untraditional 
intellectual property statutes.  In addition to the bootlegging 
∗ The author is a staff attorney at the Federal Defenders of New York and an adjunct 
professor at New York University School of Law.  He represents Jean Martignon in 
United States v. Martignon. 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). 
2 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 3 Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Am. Publishers, et al. at 20, United States. v. 
Martignon, 175 F.3d 1269 (2d Cir. May 12, 2005) (No. 04-5649-cr). 
 4 Hugh Hansen et al., Panel III: United States v. Martignon—Case in Controversy, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223 (2006) (William Patry, panelist). 
 5 See Brian Danitz, Martignon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be 
Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1181 (2005). 
 6 Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
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context, the terms have also recently appeared in opinions 
weighing the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”).7  The anti-bootlegging statute and the DMCA, 
share important features that precipitated the use of the 
terminology:  they both regulate in the field of intellectual 
property, but do so in ways novel to traditional American 
intellectual property legislation, and they were both passed in 
response to world trade agreements entered into by the United 
States.  The new laws move the United States closer to embracing 
a “neighboring rights” view of intellectual property heretofore 
more closely associated with European law.  But along with this 
trend, have come questions about the scope of congressional 
authority in creating these new rights.   
When Judge Baer struck down the federal anti-bootlegging 
statute as unconstitutional, the decision sparked heated debate 
about the scope of the Copyright Clause and the enumerated 
powers of Congress.  The primary questions presented in 
Martignon were (1) whether the statute violated the Copyright 
Clause by its vesting of exclusive rights in non-“Writings,” i.e., 
live musical performances; (2) whether it violated the Copyright 
Clause by granting those rights in perpetuity; and (3) if so, whether 
Congress could nonetheless enact such legislation pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, irrespective of the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations.   
The Government took the position that the bootlegging statute 
falls entirely outside the scope of the Copyright Clause precisely 
because it regulates non-writings, and that when Congress grants 
exclusive rights to performers it does so within its authority under 
the Commerce Clause, free of any conflict with the Copyright 
Clause.  In so arguing, the Government relied heavily on the 
differences between the anti-bootlegging statute and the rights 
conferred by the Copyright Act.  Its basic premise was that the 
bootlegging statute is separate and distinct from copyright law;  
instead, it is a commercial regulation passed to comply with the 
United States’ treaty obligations. 
7 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)). 
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Mr. Martignon, on the other hand, contended that the statute 
falls squarely within the scope of the Copyright Clause since it 
regulates “the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,”8 
and that it violates the proscriptions of the clause by granting 
exclusive rights to authors of non-“Writings” and for time 
immemorial.  He further argued that Congress may not avoid those 
proscriptions by reliance on the Commerce Clause.  Here, Mr. 
Martignon relied heavily on the ways in which the statute is similar 
to traditional copyright legislation in the rights it provides to 
authors, but different in its failure to provide the same traditional 
safeguards to the beneficiaries of the public domain. 
In his opinion holding for Mr. Martignon, Judge Baer 
repeatedly referred to the statute as “copyright-like legislation,”9 
and he concluded that “Congress may not enact copyright-like 
legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute, under the 
commerce clause (or any other clause) when the legislation 
conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the Copyright 
Clause.”10  This phraseology incited considerable criticism.  
Indeed, one of the leading experts on copyright law and the author 
of the statute, William Patry, said of it: “The idea that it could be 
‘copyright-like’ I don=t quite get either.  You are pregnant or you 
are not pregnant.  Either it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a 
Copyright Clause.  It can’t be ‘copyright-like.’”11  While I confess 
to being a bigger fan of Judge Baer’s opinion than Mr. Patry, I find 
his criticism on this score valid—to a certain extent. 
Below, I discuss the terms “copyright-like” and “quasi-
copyright” and demonstrate that prior to Martignon, courts had 
typically used the terms in reference to a law’s similarity (or 
dissimilarity) to the Copyright Act; whereas in Martignon the term 
was also used in reference to the Copyright Clause.  While this 
usage in Martignon may have been somewhat imprecise, I suggest 
that the classification of a law as “copyright-like” is ultimately 
unimportant to the determination of whether the bootlegging 
statute is constitutional.  The constitutionality of the statute 
 8 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
9 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
10 Id. at 425. 
11 Hansen, supra note 4 (William Patry, panelist). 
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depends not on how it is broadly categorized but on its actual 
effects, i.e., the rights it confers and the subject matter of those 
rights.  The Copyright Clause itself does not mention the word 
“copyright;” instead it speaks of “exclusive rights” granted “for 
limited times” to “Authors” for their “Writings.”12  When 
analyzing how those terms have been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, it becomes clear that the bootlegging statute falls squarely 
within the scope of the Copyright Clause and that Judge Baer’s 
conclusion is well supported despite his terminology.  While 
“copyright-like” and “quasi-copyright” may provide useful 
shorthands for describing the increasing number of non-traditional 
laws regulating intellectual property, the terms themselves do not 
answer any of the fundamental questions at issue; they merely beg 
them. 
I. MOGHADAM, RAILWAY LABOR AND MARTIGNON 
In 1994, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the 
unauthorized recording and transmission of live musical 
performances and the subsequent copying or distribution of such 
“bootleg” recordings.13  Prior to this legislation, prohibitions on 
“bootlegging”14 had been left to individual states, the majority of 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress has the power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). 
 14 A bootleg album or compact disc is an unauthorized recording of a live musical 
performance that is not generally commercially available.  Bootlegs are distinguishable 
from counterfeit or pirated albums, which contain copyrighted content that has been 
previously recorded and distributed. See Lee H. Russo, The Criminalization of 
Bootlegging: Unnecessary and Unwise, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 172 (2002).  A 
“counterfeit” recording mimics an official release in its entirety, down to its packaging 
and trademarks and are “duplicates of commercially released albums intended to look 
like the original.” Dawn R. Maynor, Just Let the Music Play: How Classic Bootlegging 
Can Buoy the Drowning Music Industry, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 173, 175 (2002).  A 
“pirated” recording also contains commercially released material but without mimicking 
the entire content or packaging of the official product. See The Recording Industry 
Association of America (“RIAA”), Anti-Piracy News and Issues page, 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2006) (definitions for 
bootleg, counterfeit, and piracy promulgated by RIAA). 
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which prohibited unauthorized recordings.15  The federal statute 
was passed in response to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade negotiations, which included the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”), to which the 
United States was a signatory.16  There is almost a complete dearth 
of legislative history related to the passage of the statute because it 
was passed using “fast-track” procedures which did not allow for 
amendment or debate.17
The statute went unchallenged until 1997 when Ali Moghadam 
was charged in the Middle District of Florida with distributing 
bootleg compact discs.18  He challenged the statute as violating the 
Copyright Clause because it granted exclusive rights to the authors 
of non-“Writings.”  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Mr. 
Moghadam, ultimately finding that Congress maintained authority 
to pass the statute under its Commerce Clause powers even 
assuming that the statute fell outside the scope of congressional 
authority under the Copyright Clause (a point the government had 
conceded).  In so doing, however, the Court was required to 
resolve “the tension”19 between its holding and that in Railway 
Labor Executives’ Association v. Gibbons.20
In Railway Labor, the Supreme Court addressed the uniformity 
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause and whether Congress could 
pass a non-uniform bankruptcy law under its Commerce Clause 
powers.21  The issue arose in 1980 when Congress enacted the 
Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assist Act 
(“RITA”) requiring a debtor railroad company in bankruptcy 
proceedings to pay $75 million to its former employees.22  The 
 15 See Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the 
Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 327, n.29 (2000) (finding that 30 states and the District of Columbia have anti-
bootlegging statutes). 
 16 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, Art. 14, Sec. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); see also, 
Maynor, supra note 14, at 187 (2002). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 19 Id. at 1279. 
 20 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 459–62. 
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trustee sued, arguing that RITA violated the Bankruptcy Clause’s 
uniformity requirement by giving preferential treatment to the 
debtor=s former employees.23
Defenders of the statute asserted that RITA was a type of labor 
law authorized by the Commerce Clause and “not a law on the 
subject of bankruptcies.”24  Therefore, they argued, the law was 
not subject to the limitations of the Bankruptcy Clause, namely the 
“uniformity” requirement, and that Congress was free to exercise 
its authority under the Commerce Clause.  The Court rejected that 
characterization, found that the law in question was indeed a 
“bankruptcy” law within the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, and 
struck down the statute.25  The holding turned on whether the law 
principally governed Congress’ regulation of the labor rights of 
workers employed in the field of interstate transportation, or 
whether it instead primarily regulated the rights and obligations of 
creditors and debtors.  In finding the latter, the Court emphasized 
that the rights created by RITA lay at the core of bankruptcy law 
and fell within the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause.26
The Moghadam court acknowledged that Railway Labor 
constrained congressional power to act pursuant to a general grant 
of authority (the Commerce Clause) where another more specific 
grant of authority (the Bankruptcy Clause) contained limitations.  
In Moghadam, however, the court found that this was the case only 
in “some circumstances” and that “the instant case is not one such 
circumstance.”27  In the context of the anti-bootlegging statute, the 
court found that the statute was “not fundamentally inconsistent” 
with the fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause.28  Rather, 
according to Moghadam, “the Copyright Clause does not envision 
that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-
 23 Id. at 463; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to enact 
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 24 Brief of Respondent-Appellee, Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons, 645 F.2d 74 
(1980) (Nos. 80-415, 80-1239), 1981 WL 390398. 
 25 Railway Labor, 455 U.S. at 466–72. 
 26 Id. 
 27 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 28 Id. 
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like protection under other constitutional clauses, such as the 
Commerce Clause. . . .”29
Throughout the opinion, the Moghadam court variously 
referred to the anti-bootlegging statute as “quasi-copyright”30 and 
“copyright-like”31 owing to its creation of “hybrid rights that in 
some ways resemble the protections of copyright law but in other 
ways are distinct from them.”32  In so categorizing the statute, the 
court noted that the bootlegging statute did not confer the same 
exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act and that it was 
unclear whether many of copyright law’s related doctrines such as 
fair use and work-for-hire applied to the bootlegging context.33  
The court ultimately concluded that “extending quasi-copyright 
protection to unfixed live musical performances is in no way 
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, even if that Clause itself 
does not directly authorize such protection.”34
Notably, however, the Moghadam court explicitly reserved 
judgment on whether the statute was fundamentally inconsistent 
with the “Limited Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause 
because Mr. Moghadam failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  
Though not ruling on it, the Court nonetheless gave its opinion that 
the issue was, at the very least, problematic: “On its face, the 
protection created by the anti-bootlegging statute is apparently 
perpetual and contains no express time limit; therefore 
phonorecords of live musical performances would presumably 
never fall into the public domain.”35
Four years after the Eleventh Circuit=s decision, in United 
States v. Martignon,36 Judge Baer was presented with the issue left 
undecided in Moghadam.  In 2003, Jean Martignon was charged 
with violating the anti-bootlegging statute by selling bootleg 
compact discs from his record store in New York City.  He 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 1273. 
 31 Id. at 1280. 
 32 Id. at 1272. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1280. 
 35 Id. at 1281. 
 36 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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challenged the constitutionality of the statute as violating both the 
“Writings” and “Limited Times” requirements of the Copyright 
Clause.37  Judge Baer seized upon the “copyright-like” language in 
Moghadam and expanded upon its importance in determining 
whether the statute was constitutional by stating that the first step 
in his analysis was to categorize the statute as either “a copyright 
law or a commercial regulation.”38  He concluded the first part of 
his analysis by finding that, “[b]ased on the anti-bootlegging 
statute’s language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyright-
like regulation.”39  He then determined that the Copyright Clause 
did not empower Congress to pass the statute because it failed to 
meet both the “Writings” and “Limited Times” requirements.40  
Lastly, he found that the limitations of the Copyright Clause 
constrained congressional authority generally such that Congress 
could not enact the statute pursuant to some other grant of 
authority like the Commerce Clause.41  Here, Judge Baer elevated 
the importance of the “copyright-like” terminology, by holding, 
“Congress may not enact copyright-like legislation, such as the 
anti-bootlegging, under the commerce clause (or any other clause), 
when the legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the 
Copyright Clause.” 
Critics of the decision in Martignon have consistently attacked 
Judge Baer’s use of the term “copyright-like.”  The Government in 
its appeal to the Second Circuit argued that by comparing the 
bootlegging statute to the bankruptcy statute in Railway Labor the 
Martignon court was making a fundamental error because RITA 
was not a “bankruptcy-like” statute.42  Rather, the statute “directly 
created rules for a specific bankruptcy case.”43  In their amicus 
curiae for the Government’s position, the Association of American 
Publishers, et al., charged that “the court below does not explain 
what is meant by the phrase ‘copyright-like.’  Insofar as the 
 37 Id. at 417–18. 
 38 Id. at 419. 
 39 Id. at 422. 
 40 Id. at 424. 
 41 Id. at 428. 
 42 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2d 
Cir. May 12, 2005) (No. 04-5649-cr). 
 43 Id.  
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decision below turns on the ‘copyright-like’ character of anti-
bootlegging protection, the imprecision of that term is an 
additional reason for rejecting that court’s decision.”44  As noted 
above, the author of the statute, William Patry, stated in this panel 
discussion that “[t]he idea that it could be ‘copyright-like’ I don’t 
quite get either.  You are pregnant or you are not pregnant.  Either 
it is a Copyright Clause or it is not a Copyright Clause.  It can’t be 
‘copyright-like.’”45  Also, at least one member of the Second 
Circuit panel sitting at the oral argument, asked the Government 
whether there was any precedent for the use of the term, to which 
the Government responded in the negative.46
More recently, a court in the Central District of California 
disagreed with Martignon in upholding the civil analogue to the 
anti-bootlegging statute.  In KISS Catalog v. Passport 
International Productions,47 the court, upon reconsideration after 
intervention by the United States, found the reasoning of 
Moghadam persuasive, and with respect to the copyright-like 
language of Martignon, found that “this characterization, even if 
valid, is not particularly helpful.  As the United States points out, 
nothing prohibits Congress from protecting similar things in 
different ways—so long as some provision of the United States 
Constitution allows it to do so.”48
II. “COPYRIGHT-LIKE” 
Debate over the bootlegging statute is not the only arena in 
which the term “copyright-like” has been employed.  Most 
frequently, it has arisen in the context of federal preemption of 
state laws which have features of copyright law.  Section 301(a) of 
the Copyright Act preempts any “legal or equitable rights [under 
state law] that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of 
 44 Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Am. Publishers et al., supra note 3. 
 45 Hansen, supra note 4 (William Patry, panelist). 
 46 Transcript of Oral Argument, Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2d Cir. July 12, 
2005) (No. 04-5649-cr). 
 47 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 48 Id. at 1174. 
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authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and 
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102 
and 103.”49  Section 301 has resulted in a number of challenges to 
various state laws governing unfair competition and rights of 
publicity.  In one such case, Pivot Point v. Charlene Products, 
Judge Easterbrook (sitting by designation as a district court judge), 
found that a state law unfair competition claim was preempted by 
the Copyright Act but also acknowledged that under different 
circumstances some “copyright-like” state claims might stand.50
The term has also been used in evaluating the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).51  The DMCA was passed 
in 1998 in response to the United States’ adoption of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.  The DMCA 
prohibits, inter alia, the distribution of certain “anti-
circumvention” technologies, i.e., technologies that allow persons 
to circumvent restrictions encrypted on digital copyrighted 
materials.  In 2001, Elcom, a company that sold software making it 
possible for consumers to lift restrictions placed on books sold in 
digital format, was indicted under the criminal provisions of the 
DMCA.  In United States v. Elcom Ltd.,52 the court addressed a 
variety of constitutional challenges raised by Elcom, including a 
Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge, First Amendment 
challenges to the statute’s restrictions on speech and expression, 
and a Copyright Clause challenge to congressional authority to 
enact the statute.  While the court dismissed all of Elcom’s 
challenges, it relied heavily on, and quoted liberally from, 
Moghadam in addressing the copyright challenge.  Employing 
Moghadam’s “fundamentally inconsistent” test, the Elcom court 
upheld the DMCA, rejecting, among other arguments, Elcom’s 
contention “that Congress’ ban on the sale of circumvention tools 
 49 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
 50 170 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 
905 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Illinois’ right of publicity statute was not preempted by 
the Copyright Act but noting that states may not create “copyright-like” protections that 
conflict with federal copyright law). 
 51 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 52 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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has the effect of allowing publishers to claim copyright-like 
protection in public domain works . . .”53
The common thread running throughout these pre-Martignon 
opinions, is their use of the term “copyright-like” in reference to a 
statute’s similarities and differences with the Copyright Act.  The 
preemption cases do so explicitly by referring to Section 301 of the 
Copyright Act, which asserts federal supremacy over all things 
“equivalent” to copyright.  The court in Elcom did so by its heavy 
reliance on Moghadam and its ultimate conclusion that the 
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions did not extend any of the 
rights granted by the Copyright Act, i.e., the “exclusive rights to 
reproduce, and distribute copies of an original work of authorship, 
to make derivative works, and to perform the work publicly, for a 
limited time.”54
And finally, the court in Moghadam explained in detail what it 
meant when describing the anti-bootlegging statute as conferring 
“hybrid rights” that were best described as “quasi-copyright or sui 
generis protections.”55  The court listed the rights granted by § 106 
of the Copyright Act and noted that the anti-bootlegging statute did 
not confer all of those same rights.56  It also noted the uncertainty 
of whether copyright concepts like fair use, work-for-hire, limited 
duration, and the statute of limitations were applicable to the anti-
bootlegging statute.57
In Martignon, however, the court, at times, used the term 
“copyright-like” in a decidedly different manner, and it is this 
usage that has fueled many of the opinion’s critics.  In addition to 
using the term “copyright-like” to describe the anti-bootlegging 
statute’s relationship to the rights conferred by the Copyright Act, 
the Martignon court also used the term to describe the statute in 
relation to the subject matter of the Copyright Clause. 
Whether the bootlegging statute falls within the scope of the 
Copyright Clause is virtually determinative of whether the statute 
 53 Id. at 1141; see also 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 
F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–18). 
 54 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. 
 55 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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is constitutional.58  If, as the United States argues, the statute falls 
outside the scope of the Copyright Clause because it regulates non-
“Writings,” then it is easy to see why Congress could validly 
exercise its Commerce Clause powers to enact it.  If the regulation 
of live performances and the resulting recordings of those 
performances is something separate and apart from the subject 
matter regulated by the Copyright Clause, then nothing in the 
Copyright Clause would restrain congressional action; and if 
another clause, such as the Commerce Clause, provides Congress 
with the power to regulate performances, then Congress may do so, 
uninhibited by the limitations of the Copyright Clause. 
If, however, the anti-bootlegging statute regulates subject 
matter that falls within the scope of the Copyright Clause, it is easy 
to see why Congress would be constrained by the limitations 
imposed therein, regardless of additional grants of power such as 
the Commerce Clause that might otherwise provide Congress with 
the authority to enact the law.  Here, Railway Labor is dispositive: 
Congress may not resort to other more general grants of authority 
to do what is forbidden by a more specific constitutional limitation. 
The Martignon court, by classifying the statute as “copyright-
like,” largely by reference to its similarity to the Copyright Act, 
while also using the term “copyright-like” to refer to that which 
falls within the scope of the Copyright Clause, gave near 
dispositive weight to the classification.  While the classification 
can be instructive, it should not be dispositive, and here, the critics 
are right to question the terminology.  The holding in Martignon, 
however, remains sound because the bootlegging statute does 
indeed fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause. 
III. MARTIGNON WAS RIGHTLY DECIDED 
The bootlegging statute prohibits a variety of conduct, 
including the unauthorized copying of live musical performances 
and the subsequent copying or distribution of those recordings.  
 58 But see Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (writer argues that the constraints of the Copyright Clause 
should not prohibit Congress from acting pursuant to its other grants of authority). 
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Mr. Martignon challenged the statute as violating the Copyright 
Clause in two ways: (1) by violating the “Writings” requirement; 
and (2) by violating the “Limited Times” requirement. 
The first challenge is perhaps the more difficult of the two to 
resolve as it relies not purely on the text of the Copyright Clause 
but also on its history and accepted meaning.  Prior to the 
enactment of the bootlegging statute, Congress had never granted 
exclusive intellectual property rights to something not fixed in 
some sort of tangible form.  “Writings” has been interpreted to 
cover a host of tangible items, including photographs,59 graphic 
and sculptural art60 and audiovisual works,61 but never to live 
performances.62  Any regulation of performances had always been 
left to the States, the majority of which prohibited bootlegging.63
The United States, relying on the fact that performances are not 
“Writings,” argued that the bootlegging statute simply falls outside 
the realm of the Copyright Clause and thus Congress is free to use 
its Commerce Clause powers free of the Copyright Clause 
restraints.  Mr. Martignon’s response was that “Writings” does not 
mark the subject matter of the Copyright Clause; rather it imposes 
a limitation on congressional authority when it regulates within the 
scope of the Copyright Clause.  And Congress acts within the 
scope of the Clause whenever it grants exclusive rights to the 
Authors of original works that are the fruits of creative or 
intellectual labor64—whether in tangible form or not. 
The second challenge to the statute—the “Limited Times” 
challenge—is more straightforward. Here, the United States can no 
longer rely on its argument that because the statute regulates non-
“Writings,” it falls outside the scope of the Copyright Clause.  The 
 59 Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1883). 
 60 See, e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(distinguishing between useful and artistic goods); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. 
Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 
 61 See, e.g., WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 
628 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 62 See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) 
(“No respectable interpretation of the word ‘writings’ embraces an untaped performance 
of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”). 
 63 Lee, supra note 15, at n.29. 
 64 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
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statute, in addition to regulating non-“Writings” by prohibiting the 
recording of heretofore unrecorded performances, also regulates 
the subsequent copying and distribution of those recordings.  
Those tangible recordings are certainly “Writings” by any 
definition of the term.65  And the bootlegging statute’s perpetual 
prohibition on the distribution of those recordings without the 
performer=s consent is fatal.66
The Martignon court was correct to follow the example of 
Railway Labor when it looked to a variety of sources in 
determining whether the statute fell within the scope of the 
Copyright Clause.  In Railway Labor, the Supreme Court 
examined the nature of the statute at issue, RITA, and its 
legislative history in determining that it was indeed a law that fell 
within the subject matter of the Bankruptcy Clause.  Judge Baer, in 
noting the anti-bootlegging statute’s language, its similarity to the 
Copyright Act, and its legislative history grounded in a treaty on 
intellectual property matters, did the same when he examined what 
sort of rights were being created by the anti-bootlegging statute. 
His ultimate conclusion that “Congress may not enact 
copyright-like legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute, 
under the commerce clause (or any other clause) when the 
legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the 
Copyright Clause,” is well-supported when one understands that 
by “copyright-like” he is referring to that which falls within the 
scope of the Copyright Clause. 
The holding and the terminology are further supported by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp.67  In Dastar, the Court held that a provision of the 
 65 Some have argued that the recordings are not “Writings” because they were created 
without authorization, noting that the definition of fixation in the Copyright Act requires 
the “authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  The argument fails because it 
conflates the Copyright Act’s definition of fixation with the constitutional definition of 
“Writings” which has never been so constrained. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (defining 
a Writing as “any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic 
labor”). 
 66 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 196, 198, 208 (2003) (variously referring to 
the Copyright Clause’s “Limited Times” language as a “restriction,” “limitation,” and 
“constraint” on congressional authority). 
 67 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
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Lanham Act did not, and more importantly, could not, prevent the 
unaccredited copying of an uncopyrightable work.  Dastar, a 
production company, released a video in which it repackaged an 
old television documentary which had fallen into the public 
domain after the lapsing of its original copyright.  Dastar’s re-
release changed the ordering of the footage and listed itself as the 
producer.  The original producer of the documentary sued Dastar 
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act which creates a cause of 
action against anyone who uses in commerce either “a false 
designation of origin, or any false description or representation” in 
connection with “any goods or services.”68  In dismissing the 
claim, the Supreme Court went beyond mere statutory 
interpretation of the Lanham Act: it held that allowing such a claim 
would “create a species of mutant copyright law,”69 and was 
something that Congress “may not do.”70
Whether one refers to the anti-bootlegging statute as 
“copyright-like,” “quasi-copyright,” or the more sinister “mutant 
copyright law,” it falls squarely within the bounds of the Copyright 
Clause and the Martignon court was right to strike it down. 
IV. NEIGHBORING RIGHTS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Intellectual property rights in the United States have 
historically been positive rights handed down by Congress 
pursuant to its Copyright Clause powers.71  The rights conferred by 
Congress have been broad, covering a variety of works whose only 
common attribute is that they are “original” and have some 
“minimal degree of creativity.”72  The American system stood in 
contrast to the traditional European model of natural rights (droit 
d’auteur) in which authors enjoy protection only for works of 
“high authorship.”73  The European model reserves a separate 
 68 Id. at 29. 
 69 Id. at 34. 
 70 Id. at 37 (“To hold otherwise, would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species 
of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.”). 
 71 See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8E.01 (2004). 
 72 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
 73 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 71. 
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place for those so-called “neighboring rights” (droit voisins) which 
are “similar to those protected by copyright laws . . . but are not 
necessarily protected under a nation’s copyright law.”74  These 
neighboring rights most commonly refer “to the rights of 
performers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters.”75
In 1994, when Congress implemented the anti-bootlegging 
statute in response to the TRIPS accord, the United States for the 
first time entered the world of “neighboring rights.”  Given this 
fundamental break with traditional American intellectual property 
jurisprudence, it is no surprise that significant constitutional 
questions have arisen.  And as the United States continues to enter 
into international treaties and agreements on intellectual property, 
those same questions will undoubtedly continue to arise. 
Equally likely will be the use of various terms such as 
“copyright-like” and “quasi-copyright” to describe the newly 
created hybrid rights.  But the mere description of the newly 
created rights as such will not resolve the question of their 
constitutional validity.  Not all “copyright-like” legislation (in the 
Moghadam sense of the term) will necessary fall within the scope 
of the Copyright Clause.  The related area of trademarks 
demonstrates this.  The Lanham Act could certainly be viewed as 
conferring “copyright-like” protections to the owners of 
trademarks in that it grants the owners exclusive rights to use 
certain symbols or words.  The Supreme Court has held, however, 
that trademarks do not fall within the scope of the Copyright 
Clause because they do not meet the requirement of originality; 
instead they arise out of use or “priority of appropriation” in 
relation to a product=s branding.76  Trademarks thus stand in 
contrast to the recordings of live musical performances which are 
certainly creative and original under the Supreme Court=s 
definition of those terms. 
As the bootlegging context shows, the term “copyright-like” 
can be used to either support or criticize a statute depending on 
 74 Stephen Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules and Roadblocks 
on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759, 
768 (1997). 
 75 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 71. 
 76 The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
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whether one emphasizes the similarities or differences between the 
new law and traditional notions of copyright.  As Congress 
continues to pass untraditional intellectual property laws that grant 
similar but not identical rights to those found in the Copyright Act, 
it will be incumbent upon courts to clarify what is meant by 
“copyright-like.”  Recognition that a law creates hybrid rights is 
only the first step in assessing its constitutional validity. 
 
 
